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Introduction 
The welfare state has long been sustained by public opinion; hence, fluctuation in 
public support for the welfare state is not a new phenomenon. Over the last century, its 
growth and decline in various countries is evidence of how the welfare regime responds 
to factors affecting societal attitudes.  Industrial European countries have held the 
welfare state to be a pillar of society with committed beneficiaries for decades, making it 
relatively impervious to pressure (Pierson 1994). Specifically in Scandinavian countries 
such as Denmark, the high levels of institutionalization for welfare systems have 
generated a durability that relies heavily on the support for redistribution (Esping-
Andersen 1990). Yet, recently the influence of retrenchment advocates has increased so 
that even policymakers on the left have begun contemplating possible private sector 
alternatives (Neville 2013; Dam 2014; Vangkilde 2014). While in the past, policymakers 
with even the slightest inclination towards neoliberal reforms and cuts have met with 
negative responses (Kuhnle & Eitrheim 1999, Svallfors 1999), the boldness would imply 
a decreased fear of repercussions from the population and its staunch support for the 
welfare state. Scholars attribute support for the welfare state to both situational and 
ideological factors (Blekesaune 2007; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989).  
Studies surrounding public opinion, particularly in Scandinavia, have noted 
changing perceptions reflected in support for the welfare state, including resistance to 
continued expansion (Bergmark et al. 2000). Scholars found that falling support for 
policies occurred when programs no longer lived up to prior expectations (Kumlin 2002; 
Svallfors 2002). In contrast, recent findings put forth by Svallfors (2011) concerning 
Swedish opinions show the opposite, that attitudes have remained largely stable, despite 
wide-ranging marketization of the welfare state over the last two decades. But if support 
for government involvement in welfare policies is not changing, how are governments 
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and policymakers able to consider and institute policies aimed at privatization? 
Foundational research has shown that citizens will be primed to punish politicians who 
try to retrench social insurance (Pierson 1994; 1996), but instead, permissive attitudes 
are observed in countries where they are least expected. Because attitudes toward 
welfare are such a crucial factor in welfare state reform, understanding how these 
attitudes are shaped is critically important to the overall study of welfare in Europe and 
beyond. 
One key factor that the literature often overlooks is the effect of ethnic diversity 
and racial differences that can inevitably cause rifts in the social order (Gilens 1995; 
1996; Oberg et al. 2011). Though a number of scholars will mention the divisive nature 
of these differences in passing, it is only in more recent years that racial and ethnic 
differences are considered to be serious factors and this most often is mentioned in a 
comparative context with the United States (Gilens 1999; Alesina et al. 2001).  
The purpose of this research is to discern whether or not a causal relationship 
exists between the changes in homogeneity within a society and public support for the 
welfare state. Observable trends in immigration and public opinion among 
industrialized European nations would suggest the plausibility of such a relationship. 
While it has already been noted that policymakers have demonstrated an increased 
interest in privatization of portions of the welfare regime, another indicator of the 
effects of ethnic diversity on the attitudes of a population is the rise in popularity of far-
right, populist nationalist parties in a number of countries including the Netherlands, 
Italy, France, Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark to varying 
levels of extreme (Van der Brug & Fennema 2008). Characterized by anti-immigrant, 
Islamophobic and even anti-EU policies, these movements have seen expanded influence 
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in recent years that sometimes result in extremist behavior such as the violent massacre 
of 69 people in Norway in 2011. While there are a number of potential explanations for 
the recent trend, the xenophobic rhetoric utilized by many party leaders would suggest 
a strong and hostile reaction to ethnic diversity that is likely to have ripple effects on 
policies other than immigration (i.e. welfare policy). At the same time, the level of 
immigration in many industrial European nations is growing (see fig. 1), which 
naturally increases the amount of visibility of immigrants and the amount of 
interactions between the native and immigrant populations. Current research on welfare 
reform and research focusing on the rise of far-right parties have remained relatively 
separate. The purpose here is to examine whether there is a connection: does the rise in 
immigration and the attendant increase in support for anti-immigrant parties help to 
explain changes in support for the welfare state? 
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Theoretical motivations for the research concern the critical dynamic between 
in-groups and out-groups. The influence of racial prejudice has long been a powerful 
motivator to explain a lack of solidarity and trust in more diverse or fragmented 
societies, where extensive literature documents individuals’ tendencies to favor 
members of their own group (Habyarimana et al. 2007). Because ethnic and racial 
differences are very strong forms of group identification, it is likely that ethnic 
heterogeneity acts as an obstacle to solidarity (Alesina et al. 2001). While the previous 
claims are framed around the welfare policies in the United States, juxtaposing these 
observations with the higher levels of homogeneity in industrial, Northern European 
countries provides an interesting background for such theories. The formation of many 
European welfare states occurred in a context where smaller countries comprised of 
highly homogenous populations. Thus it is reasonable to examine the impact of recent 
increases in heterogeneity of the population arising from non-Western immigration on 
support for retrenchment in Northern Europe. 
 
Review of Literature 
 
The first step in studying the public’s attitudes for welfare is to properly identify 
and define the subject. Though there is a clear “core” associated with welfare among 
scholars, the boundaries are often less easily agreed upon. For this study’s purposes, 
Esping-Andersen’s definition serves as a powerful foundation: 
 
Above all, it must involve the granting of social rights. If social rights are given 
the legal and practical status of property rights, if they are inviolable, and if 
they are granted on the basis of citizenship rather than performance, they will 
entail a de-commodification of the status of individuals vis-à-vis the market 
(1990: 21). 
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The focus on de-commodification of individuals—the guaranteed survival of 
workers that is not contingent upon the scale of their labor—is the driving factor of his 
definition, which he notes is a recent development in contemporary welfare states. 
Minimally, these states must entail that “citizens can freely, and without potential loss 
of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it 
necessary” (1990: 23). For Esping-Andersen, the concept of de-commodification is used 
to compare and classify welfare regimes into three different categories: liberal, 
corporatist, and social democratic. Esping-Anderson develops a system of categorizing 
the different welfare states by their structure and ultimately, their ability to develop 
systems of stratification and solidarity within each regime. The essence of the welfare 
state, and what separates different regimes into different typologies, is their focus on the 
redistribution or pooling of risk. He notes that the Scandinavian welfare states, which 
are the focus of this study, tend to be the most universal and egalitarian.   
Understanding and interpreting ethnic diversity is a complicated undertaking, to 
say the least. Traditional means of measuring and conceptualizing ethnic diversity is the 
index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF). The ELF, as described in a study by 
Alesina and colleagues (2003), considers population cleavages by language, religion, and 
ethnicity. However, as they note, the data from different countries is often difficult to 
interpret. For example, while the United States collects census data surrounding 
language, religion, and race, some European countries do not often report on the racial 
differences within their population, but instead focus solely on “ethnicity”, which largely 
reflects languages. These complications create a lack of uniformity in systems of 
measurement.  
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For the purposes of this study, immigration data serves as a better measure of 
diversity. Because Europe remained relatively ethnically homogenous for so long, 
especially Scandinavian countries, immigration data provides an accurate reflection of 
the increasing levels of diversity felt by members of society. Additionally, because much 
of the reactions to decreasing ethnic homogeneity are voiced in the form of anti-
immigration rhetoric—mainly promulgated by newly-popular, far-right political 
parties—there is support for the concept of immigration and ethnic diversity in general 
as a relatively new phenomenon for many European countries. Thus immigration data 
would provide an accurate reflection of the shifting levels of ethnic diversity perceived 
and reflected in the attitudes of the public.  
 
Explanations for Change in Support for Welfare State in Europe  
 
 Various factors are employed to explain change in support for the welfare state 
in Northern Europe ranging from demographic change (aging), globalization, 
deindustrialization, budget crises, or neoliberal ideals. Because public opinion and 
support for the welfare state tends to be reflected in the actual policy outcomes, the 
studies will not be limited to what affects public support for the welfare state, but also 
what affects the expansion or retrenchment of the welfare state. This assumption is 
especially powerful when considering welfare state retrenchment, which is much more 
reliant upon public support for its existence due to the strong existing support bases 
that must first shift (Pierson 1996).  Additionally, because of the extensive number of 
studies dealing with welfare state change, the review of literature is more selective and 
focuses on the strands of thought concerning the driving influences on the welfare 
regime.  
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Response to Changing Pressures  
 
Support for the welfare state is often claimed to be responsive to changing 
pressures on the society where it exists. The first such pressure to be considered is the 
effect of demographic change, which is best understood in regards to aging or the 
shifting demographic burden. In much of Europe, the population is getting older; 
simultaneously there is a smaller replacement rate from generation to generation. 
Changing demographics mean that the ratio of working-aged population to aged 
population is shrinking over time so that fewer people are contributing to welfare 
programs as more people began to draw out of them. While opponents of the welfare 
state often portray this problem as a time bomb—certain to bring about its downfall—
Huber and Stephens (2001) argue that the imminent crisis has varying effects depending 
on the country where it is located. They argue that the working-aged population is 
often an inaccurate number because it counts many adults that are not contributing 
taxes to the support of the welfare state including unemployed, disabled, early retirees, 
and those on social assistance, in labor market training, and in education, along with 
adults not in the labor force, mainly housewives. Thus, in their view, the dependency 
ratio is often misrepresented. In reality then, this means that the welfare state is and has 
been supported and sustained by a very small ratio of contributors to non-contributors 
throughout its existence. However, as Huber and Stephens point out, for many 
countries there is room for improvement as more women are able to enter the working 
population due to more female-friendly labor policies such as maternity leave. In this 
area, social democratic welfare states are in some of the strongest positions due to their 
favorable active to non-active ratios in the work force. From this argument it would 
seem that welfare retrenchment is not truly dependent upon changing demographics 
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since pressures to support the growing aging population are not strongly felt and many 
countries working populations have yet to reach their maximum capacity and still have 
room to grow. The resilience of welfare programs can also be attributed to the idea that 
once instituted, social policies develop support bases that make any cuts particularly 
difficult, which is especially true among the aged populations (Pierson 1996). Finally, 
because it is understood that everyone can expect to grow old—and thus draw on 
benefits—it is unlikely that an increasingly aging population would support the welfare 
state less over time (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). 
Like the shifting demographic burden, the effect of globalization—which for 
Europe includes increasing European integration—is often experienced differently 
depending on the style of welfare regime. The three general typologies of welfare states 
(liberal, social democratic, and corporatist) would interpret the impacts of globalization 
to be more strongly felt in states with national policies toward maintaining full 
employment (Esping-Andersen 1991; Korpi 2003).  The reliance on high employment 
rates in certain production regimes enables the sustainment of generous welfare regimes 
such as those in Northern Europe. These high production policies create largely export-
dependent countries, which necessitate the ability to compete in international markets. 
Thus the theory is that as competitiveness increases, states framed around such a 
scheme will suffer significantly as individual economies unable to compete are 
overwhelmed in the global economy (Strange 1996; Stryker 1998). Specifically, this 
would increase the people dependent on welfare state transfers and decrease the amount 
of people paying taxes to support the welfare state, which causes severe fiscal stress 
where international economic competition and integration force governments to scale 
back expensive welfare programs (Huber & Stephens 2001). Huber and Stephens argue 
 10 
that the increased internationalization decreases the policy options of governments and 
that “welfare state retrenchment [is] primarily driven by unemployment” (2001). The 
focus on mass unemployment is echoed in Korpi’s research, in which he largely 
discounts research based on expenditure data that tends to “blur the contours of 
retrenchment” (2003:18-19). Instead, both scholars agree that the role of globalization 
on the European welfare state is best demonstrated by focusing on employment levels, 
which affects each economy to a different extent dependent upon the government’s 
ability to react. This means that different welfare states will react differently to such 
pressures as globalization. Fortunately, for the Scandinavian welfare states, Huber and 
Stephens (2001) also claim that they are the best equipped to adapt to the new economic 
environment due to their higher investment in human capital.  Multiple scholars also 
argue that globalization’s threat is least powerful against those more generous social 
democratic states due to their historical reliance on international openness and highly 
globalized economies (Swank 2002; Hall and Soskice 2001; Brady et al. 2005). This 
argument in combination with the Northern European countries’ consistently high 
levels of growth would seem to show that the welfare regimes are not as vulnerable to 
the global economy as predicted. Studies by Paul Pierson, moreover, largely dismiss 
globalization as a source for fundamental change, citing the widespread popular support 
for welfare policies and the path dependence that it creates (1994; 1996). These concepts 
support the notion that once again, instead of retrenchment, globalization would 
increase support for the welfare state since the population would be much more reliant 
on social policies during times of unemployment, such as increasing global competition. 
Pierson’s work is also supported by a number of other studies, which largely agree on 
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the remarkable extent to which the European welfare states have proven resistant to 
change and retrenchment (Korpi 2003). 
In contrast with the argument that globalization acts as a primary influence for 
change in support for the welfare state, Iversen and Cusack argue that instead of 
globalization, deindustrialization is the main source of change (2000). By studying the 
responses of different states to the impact of globalization, Iverson and Cusack conclude 
that it is the domestic, not international forces that affect the welfare state. Relying on 
the same typology as before, the study begins by separating the industrialized welfare 
states into three different categories organized by how they chose to respond to the 
high amounts of unemployment that erupted after globalization set in. However, instead 
of contributing the changes faced by industrialized economies to globalization, Iversen 
and Cusack claim, “increasing productivity, changing consumption patterns, and 
saturated demand for products from the traditional sectors of the economy are the main 
forces of change” (2000: 313). These “structural sources” of risk ultimately led 
governments to dramatically alter the existing employment structures in three 
fundamental ways. It is due to these different internal responses to the perceived shifts 
that Iverson and Cusack adhere to the idea that changes to the welfare state are a 
function of deindustrialization, not globalization.  
Naturally, no one theory can account fully for change in attitudes toward the 
welfare state. However, considering the different pressures, it would seem that aging is 
more a source of media attention than actual changes. The universality of such risks 
ensures continuing support from the public. Furthermore, the effects of globalization, 
while placing pressure on the welfare state, would most likely influence the population’s 
support for welfare policies in a positive way. Increasing needs to be competitive in 
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global markets would generate less employment for unskilled workers in developed 
economies, which results in heavier reliance on welfare as people attempt to adapt in a 
post-industrial world. Yet, even as scholars argue that these pressures will ultimately 
force developed economies to reform, there is a general agreement that social 
democratic welfare regimes are in the best position to address such changes. Thus, 
neither pressure effectively generates the social support for retrenchment of welfare 
policies.  
The third pressure suggested in Iversen and Cusack’s study, proposes a very 
strong case that it is the individual countries’ internal reactions, mainly in the form of 
deindustrialization, that are the true source of pressure affecting support for the welfare 
state (2000). However, while they focus on technological advance and shifting demand 
patterns that inevitably creates unemployment for those with less transferable skills, 
they leave future discussion open-ended. This is where the argument for the effects of 
ethnic diversity can serve to enrich the conversation.  Swank and Betz argue that the 
loss of unskilled labor has led to a growth in support for far-right parties who see 
globalization and deindustrialization policies as the source of their problem (2002). 
Moreover, as more ethnically diverse populations flow into Europe—the majority of 
them low-skilled—their presence in already shrinking labor sectors generates negative 
attitudes in native workers who face increasing competition for jobs and lower wages 
(Dancygier & Donnelly 2013). 
  
Economic and Financial Crises 
 
According to Pierson’s New Politics of the Welfare State (2001), the welfare state 
is facing a period of permanent austerity. After taking into account the changes in the 
global economy and dismissing the idea of a convergence towards neoliberal ideas, he 
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argues that the welfare state still faces intense pressures for austerity that are in conflict 
with its enduring popularity. These pressures include those discussed in this paper such 
as demographic shifts, globalization, and deregulation. However, in agreement with 
other literature, he agrees that there is a need to recognize the three quite distinct 
configurations of welfare states among the affluent democracies. Pierson’s analysis 
surrounding the varying effects of permanent austerity on the different welfare regimes 
described social democratic countries in the following manner: 
 
In most respects…the social democratic countries have had less need to focus 
on issues of recalibration—certainly when compared to the conservative regime 
which I will discuss in a moment. In particular, there has been relatively little 
need for what I have termed updating—the adjustment of old welfare states to 
new needs and demands. …The social democratic regime sustains very high 
rates of labour force participation for both men and women; it supports 
comparatively high fertility levels; it has extensive experience with active 
labour market policies designed to restrict exclusion and enhance skills; and it 
contains none of the clientelistic remnants that constitute such a costly problem 
on much of the European continent. (2001: 444) 
 
Additionally, scholars have considered the effects of financial crises on attitudes 
toward the welfare state, including the most recent Great Recession of 2008. Margalit’s 
analysis (2013) centers on the personal experiences of those who suffered under the 
most recent crisis and monitors how it shaped social policy preferences. What he finds is 
that while such experiences yield sizeable attitudinal shifts in the short run, overall the 
effect on preferences was transient in nature. Applying these findings to other affluent 
democracies would suggest that such economic shocks in general are likely to have little 
long run effects on public support for welfare policies.  
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Once again, the argument that distinct countries yield distinct reactions 
maintains resonance. Pierson claims that affluent welfare states are facing a new era of 
permanent austerity that is highly likely to shape attitudes toward future welfare 
policies. However, he maintains that the social democratic countries have weathered the 
shifts better than most countries through implementation of minimal reforms. While 
this information would seem to imply a relatively stable future for Scandinavian 
regimes, recent years demonstrate otherwise. Privatization policies have become 
increasingly common as citizens begin to grow skeptical of the institutions’ ability to 
meet expectations (Bergmark et al. 2000; Kumlin 2002; Svallfors 2002;). In Sweden, the 
pension system has seen recent partial privatization (Svallfors 2011) as well as many of 
their health care services and the introduction of for-profit free schools (Ramesh 2012). 
Denmark’s actions have garnered equal attention in recent years, including its push to 
overhaul entitlements (Daley 2013) and its dismantlement of the old education model 
(Witcombe 2013). The lack of backlash felt—or the lack of concern demonstrated in the 
face of protests—by policymakers responsible for implementing such supposedly 
unpopular policies would seem to contradict Pierson’s suggestions.  
 
Neoliberal Ideals 
 
The effect of shifting ideologies may be another potent factor for explaining 
changing support for the welfare state. Valuable research has been done surrounding 
the formation of ideologies, which dismisses “self-interest” as a force responsible for 
shaping welfare preferences (Gilens 1999; Margalit 2013). Specific studies suggest that 
“reciprocity”-based variables (including egalitarianism and basic needs generosity) are 
better predictors of support for redistribution than “self-interest”-based variables 
(including socioeconomic variables) (León 2012). This theory is especially strong when 
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considering situations of unemployment, for which support is more ideologically based. 
Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) argue this is because while all people expect to be old 
and many face to the risk of being sick, which would simply support the argument for 
self-interest, not all people expect to be unemployed. Supporting welfare state policies 
for the unemployed, then, seems to be dependent upon ideology, which can vary 
between egalitarian and non-egalitarian tendencies. This variation is illustrated often by 
national differences in attitudes toward welfare state policies concerning the 
unemployed, which they claim reflect similar differences in egalitarian ideology. 
Furthermore, Blekesaune and Quadagno assert that in situations of high unemployment, 
public support for welfare policies is generally higher. According to their research, high 
unemployment “triggers changes in public attitudes toward the welfare state…[by 
making]…citizens of modern industrialized countries aware of the fact that they are 
vulnerable to risks beyond their control” (2003: 424).  
 In direct conflict with their ideas, Stryker (1998) instead suggests that higher 
unemployment levels—in this case brought about by globalization and deregulation—
can create environments conducive to neoliberal ideologies. The “global diffusion of 
neoliberalism”, as he puts it, directly influences systemic welfare retrenchment (1999: 
10). Jessop (2002) further claims that individualized interests are eroding the attention 
to collective problems. However, while these concepts seem alarming, welfare states are 
still able to respond flexibly (Taylor-Gooby 2005), and nations that are more 
historically egalitarian—for example, the Scandinavian welfare states—typically 
demonstrate more positive public attitudes toward welfare policies (Blekesaune & 
Quadagno 2003; Van Oorschot et al. 2012).  
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Scandinavian public opinion research shows that the public support for 
redistributive policies in generous welfare states will be, and so far has been largely 
unaffected by the spread of neoliberalism (Svallfors 1997; 2011). However, the argument 
does not necessarily hold up to empirical observations. As previously mentioned, recent 
policy trends toward more neoliberal practices—such as the privatization of welfare 
policies—that have been widely accepted by the general population, would clearly 
indicate a puzzling shift in attitudes. In an effort to explain such a divergence from the 
expected trend, it is useful to look towards literature surrounding ethnic diversity, 
which until the last few decades, was a relatively foreign concept for a majority of the 
Nordic populace. 
Scholars rarely take into account is that the variables associated with reciprocity, 
including egalitarian views, are strongly dependent upon societal homogeneity. While 
some mention in passing that ethnic diversity often diminishes societal solidarity 
(Huber & Stephens 2001, León 2012), because many of the industrial European 
countries—especially Scandinavia—tend to have homogenous societies, it is rarely 
given lengthy consideration. Yet, because the perception of deservingness is often 
dependent upon criteria such as identity, increasing support for reciprocity exists when 
the individuals receiving benefits are perceived as more similar (Van Oorschot 2006). 
The mirror image of this argument is that societies that are more ethnically divided are 
less likely to perceive others as deserving, which would suggest that support for 
redistribution should then decrease as people have less faith in their fellow citizens. 
 
The United States: A Comparative Look 
 
Where scholarship addressing ethnic diversity and public support for the welfare 
state is wanting in regard to Europe, American literature concerning the relationship is 
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remarkably well developed. Numerous studies have analyzed the support for welfare 
and redistribution in American society and sought to explain it testing both situational 
(i.e., unemployment, economic downturn) and ideological factors (Blekesaune & 
Quadagno 2002; Cook & Barrett 1992; Feldman 1988; Hasenfeld & Rafferty 1989). 
However, while these factors do have significance, it has also been proven that attitudes 
shaped around racial and ethnic heterogeneity strongly influence the pattern of support 
for welfare policies (Gilens 1995). Such racial and ethnic cleavages have been found to 
serve as a barrier to redistribution, not just in the United States, but also throughout 
the world (Alesina et al. 2001; Dancygier 2010). The concept has become more 
prominent in recent years due to the increasing attention paid by scholars. In Gilens’ 
book, Why Americans Hate Welfare (1999), he explores the relationship between race and 
welfare policies on the American stage by drawing a connection between Americans’ 
perceptions of the “deserving poor” and racial stereotypes. While other scholars have 
also noticed the parallel phenomena of racial fragmentation and the persistent American 
feeling that “people on welfare are lazy” (Alesina et al. 2001), Gilens argues that these 
two developments are connected and infers from this that racial attitudes diminish 
support for welfare. Because neither individualism nor self-interest led Americans to 
reject welfare on principle, Gilens focused on two additional explanations for opposition 
to welfare, which centered on perceptions of welfare recipients. These approaches 
revealed first that “the American public is strongly suspicious of the true need of welfare 
recipients” and second, “that white Americans view blacks as lacking commitment to the 
work ethic” (Gilens 1999: 60). By shifting the focus from the public’s views of welfare as 
a program to the public’s views of the individual recipients, a racialized nature of the 
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discussion of American welfare begins to reveal itself in the form of “race-coded” 
language.  
 
Where “the poor” once conjured up images of southern European or Irish 
immigrants, or of white dust-bowl farmers, urban blacks now dominate our 
perceptions of poverty. The most salient contemporary images of the poor—the 
homeless beggar, the welfare queen, the teenage ghetto gang member, the 
heroin addict shooting up in an abandoned building—are strongly associated 
with minorities in both the mass media and the public imagination. (1999: 67) 
 
Public perceptions create a racialized connotation when referring to welfare 
recipients that encourages people to imagine those relying on such programs as an 
“other”. These racial cleavages form an in-group, out-group dynamic that enforces the 
public’s dislike for welfare policies. In tandem with this dynamic, Gilens illustrates that 
a belief exists that the percent of minorities (blacks) benefitting from welfare programs 
is far higher than in reality. Combined these perceptions negatively shape public 
attitudes and drive down the public support for welfare.  
Ultimately, these findings offer insight into the current situation faced by 
European nations. As affluent welfare states begin to face decreasing ethnic 
homogeneity due to increasing levels of immigration, an eerily similar dialect emerges 
with phrases like “welfare tourists” gaining popularity with policymakers and the public 
(Economist 2014). Initially, European countries reacted by tightening immigration 
policies, however these policies met with limited success as they contradicted one of the 
European Union’s founding principles of the free movement of people (Fontanella-Khan 
2013).  
Simultaneously the amount of non-EU immigrants—specifically Middle Eastern 
and Northern African—is also increasing. Already, conflict has erupted in Scandinavian 
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countries such as Sweden, where riots led by dissatisfied immigrant youths have shaken 
the Swedish populace (Higgens 2013). The riots are said to be a result of the 
discrimination and frustration felt by immigrants, which they argue lurks under the 
surface of Swedish society. At the same time, the Swedish Democrats, the anti-
immigrant party, are gaining in popularity, which suggests rising tensions between 
ethnic Swedes and immigrants. Such situations can generate a lack of trust between 
ethnic groups, which according to Posner and his colleagues, serves to diminish support 
for cooperation and ultimately impedes the provision of public goods (Habyarinmana 
2007). 
 
Methodology 
 
The methodology to be employed in this study is two-pronged, involving a 
multi-method strategy utilizing both quantitative and qualitative data. First, a 
quantitative analysis involving cross-national public opinion data from 15 advanced 
industrial democracies between 1996 and 2006. The second portion concerns research 
collected abroad that examined the qualitative factors that might explain the observed 
statistical observations. Causal process tracing through interviews with Danish citizens 
elicit a more profound understanding of the phenomena shaping individuals’ preferences 
for redistribution, and the subsequent public opinion on welfare state reform. In this 
section, the two strategies will be discussed separately. 
 
Data 
 
The data analyzed in this study come from the 1996 and 2006 International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Role of Government surveys, which is a cross-national 
collaboration covering topics important for social science research. The decade between 
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the two surveys allows for the capture of public opinion as it changes between 1996 and 
2006—a significant time period due to the higher levels of immigration (as 
demonstrated in figure 1). From the 1996 survey, 11 countries were included in the 
analysis. These represent all countries included in the dataset for which answers were 
available in the Role of Government questionnaire on the relevant variables: the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. From the 2006 survey, 15 countries were selected: the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. Additional Role of Government surveys do exist for earlier years 
(1985 and 1990), however these earlier surveys had very limited country coverage when 
it came to the amount of countries that were included.  
The dependent variable analyzed within the ISSP Role of Government survey 
for both 1996 and 2006 asks focuses on the government’s responsibility to reduce 
income differences. The strength of the variable was selected because it captures the 
explicit support for redistribution. The specific phrasing is as follows with the responses 
coded 1 to 4:  
On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility 
to reduce income differences between the rich and poor?  
(1) Definitely should be  
(2) Probably should be  
(3) Probably should not be 
(4) Definitely should not be 
 
The first independent variable is the level of foreign-born immigrants within the 
country. As previously mentioned, the lack of uniformity for systems measuring 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) complicated using such indices as a measurement 
of ethnic homogeneity. For the purposes of this study, immigration data serves as a 
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stronger measure for rising levels of ethnic heterogeneity for two reasons. First, 
because Europe, especially Northern European countries, remained relatively ethnically 
homogenous for so long, the data collected from immigration provides an accurate 
reflection of the increasing levels of diversity perceived by members of society. Second, 
because a population’s attitudes tend to be reflected in the opinions of their 
policymakers, the rise of far-right parties with strong anti-immigrant views conveys the 
idea that the native population considers immigrants, and thus ethnic diversity in 
general, to be a relatively new phenomenon. Immigration and population figures were 
collected from the OECD Database for International Migration Statistics. The database 
publishes data collected from individual member countries, however, because illegal 
immigrants are by definition not recorded, it is likely that the total amount of 
immigrants reported in the database are underrepresented. From the database, this 
study looks at the yearly stock of foreign-born population within each OECD member 
nation. 
Additionally, the regressions controlled for the support for government 
spending on unemployment benefits. This controls for the generalized support for the 
state, which is often reflected in whether or not the government should assist during 
times of unemployment. The idea is that support for redistribution should be separated 
from support for the state as a whole. The specific wording of the question is listed 
below. 
Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each 
area. Remember that if you say ‘much more’, it might require a tax increase to pay for it. 
More or less spending for: Unemployment benefits.  
(1) Spend much more 
(2) Spend more 
(3) Spend the same as now 
(4) Spend less 
(5) Spend much less 
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Other independent variables are included to control for demographic factors 
including the age (in years), education (years in school), current employment status 
(full-time employed = 1, part-time employed = 2, less than part-time = 3, helping family 
member = 4, unemployed = 5, student = 6, retired = 7, housewife = 8, permanently 
disabled = 9, other = 10), union membership (member = 1, not a member = 2), party 
affiliation left to right (far left = 1, left, center left = 2, center, liberal = 3, right, 
conservative = 4, far right = 5), and sex (male = 1, female = 0). Finally, to ensure 
accuracy, basic economic controls were gathered from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database. The three economic controls utilized in the regression were 
the size of the economy, measured in annual GDP (in current US$), the level of wealth, 
measured as GDP per capita, the level of growth measured in annual percentage of 
GDP growth, and the annual budget balance as a percentage of GDP. These are all 
important controls to consider because they account for the various ways detailed in the 
review of literature for how rival hypotheses seek to explain high or low support for 
redistribution.  
Findings 
 
The dependent variable in the study is the level public support of redistributive 
policies, while the independent variable was the level of immigration, specifically 
foreign-born immigrants within a country. Figure 2 illustrates the individual countries’ 
responses to the ISSP Role of Government survey question across the two years 1996 
and 2006. To make the image easier to understand, support for government 
responsibility to reduce income differences has been recoded so that a decrease in 
support is represented by a falling height on the bar graph. Already, there is no visible 
trend from the respondents. Because Finland and Denmark were not included in the 
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1996 survey, it is difficult to develop a complete picture of the Northern European 
countries’ change in attitudes. Moreover, from the two Scandinavian countries that did 
take the survey, conflicting changes are revealed since Norway’s support for 
redistribution increases, while Sweden’s support decreases. However, both pictures were 
created without any controls put into place, and thus mandate further exploration.  
 
Figure 2 
 
In order to observe general trends in support for redistribution within the 
context of immigration, Figure 3 compares changing levels of support for redistribution 
to changes in the foreign-born population. Here, however, note that higher scores on 
the redistribution question imply declining support for redistribution, the same system 
that is used to code the responses initially.  This scatter plot in figure 3 illustrates the 
change in country-average responses for the question on government responsibility for 
reducing inequality (Y axis), and change in each country’s percent foreign-born 
population (X axis). Already, there is a visible correlation between the two variables 
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demonstrating that as the amount of foreign-born population increases, support for 
redistribution decreases. 
 
 
While this finding is by no means conclusive, and many controls need to be 
added before grand conclusions can be drawn, the existence of a correlation already 
suggests interesting results for the relationship between the level of immigration and 
the support for the welfare state. 
Controlling for the multiple independent variables listed above, regressions were 
run to test for a causal relationship. The results are presented in table 1. Here is it 
important to remember that the coding of the dependent variable means that a higher 
number indicates lower support for redistribution.  
The results of the statistical analysis suggest that on average, countries with a 
higher foreign-born population report a lower level of support for redistribution. There 
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is a low level of statistical significance (p < .1) that a change in the percentage of 
foreign-born population affects preferences for redistribution. This was surprising 
considering the strong empirical and theoretical motivations behind the study. Though 
the statistical significance is low, it should not be dismissed altogether, especially 
considering the lower sample size (n = 25). Unfortunately, the lower level of 
significance does not offer strong evidence that the percent of foreign-born population 
has an effect—especially considering the confidence interval, which has a range that 
includes zero. 
The results ultimately point to a different conclusion; they suggest that while 
the absolute volume of immigrants may have an affect on the support for redistributive 
policies, the actual effect of immigrants is likely more nuanced in nature. This 
suggestion is further supported by qualitative data articulated in the second half of the 
study. Additionally, while these data yield a preliminary result, there is a level of 
uncertainty present concerning what the immigration data are actually measuring. A 
dominant factor that could ultimately affect the findings in the study is whether or not 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      25 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    13) =   11.28 
       Model |  1.33666796    11  .121515269           Prob > F      =  0.0001 
    Residual |  .140092219    13  .010776325           R-squared     =  0.9051 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8249 
       Total |  1.47676018    24  .061531674           Root MSE      =  .10381 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Redist Supp-Y       Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Unempl Supp |   .3755696    .087773     4.28   0.001     .1859475    .5651917 
Foreign-born |   1.389492    .731314     1.90   0.080    -.1904161      2.9694 
Econ. Growth |   .0401478   .0166872     2.41   0.032     .0040973    .0761983 
  Budget Bal |  -.0045608   .0017566    -2.60   0.022    -.0083557    -.000766 
Size of Econ |   .0587431   .0095331     6.16   0.000     .0381481    .0793381 
         Age |   .0256373   .0133593     1.92   0.077    -.0032237    .0544983 
   Education |  -.0037272   .0071267    -0.52   0.610    -.0191235    .0116692 
  Employment |  -.1775789   .1103449    -1.61   0.132    -.4159647    .0608068 
Union Member |  -.2648755   .0799388    -3.31   0.006    -.4375728   -.0921783 
 Party Affil |   .0642634   .0286087     2.25   0.043     .0024582    .1260687 
         Sex |   2.037496   .7199081     2.83   0.014     .4822295    3.592763 
        Cons |  -2.529083   1.210291    -2.09   0.057    -5.143758    .0855927 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  
Table 1 
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the foreign-born population accurately captures true in-group, out-group dynamics. 
However, while not conclusive in nature, there is a reasonable suggestion that a 
negative relationship does exist between the percentage of foreign-born population and 
the support for redistribution.  
A major setback for the study was the limited amount of countries that initially 
participated in the ISSP Role of Government surveys. While the participation for 1996 
and 2006 was sufficient, higher participation in the preliminary years would have 
provided a more complete regression over time. Furthermore, because even many 
developed countries did not keep stable records of immigration data over time, 
comparing changes in the overall level of ethnic diversity was another obstacle to a 
more complete study. Future research would absolutely benefit such a study as the 
situation unfolds and opinions towards immigration develop. 
Immigration and Welfare Dynamics in Denmark 
Denmark provides a valuable case study for the project due to its historically 
high levels of homogeneity through the latter portion of twentieth century, an 
increasing amount of foreign immigrants (see fig. 4), and recent trends toward 
diminishing support for the traditional welfare state. These features culminate in a sort 
of “natural experiment” for application of the theories suggested in the United States 
literature and offer a strong case for comparison. Interviews provide an opportunity for 
face-to-face interaction which allows for the observation of instantaneous responses 
rather than thought-out answers, the possibility of follow up questions, and additionally 
facilitates the development of a research design more conducive to the collection of 
unbiased results. A smaller, country-specific case study moreover enables a more 
intimate setting to enhance the collection of personal narratives in research. The field 
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research was conducted during the month of December 2013 and consisted of a 
convenience sample of 25 Danish citizens. Citizens were selected then interviewed in a 
variety of neutral locations such as cafes, libraries and various public places throughout 
Copenhagen. 
Findings 
The qualitative data suggest interesting conclusions. When asked about their 
support for redistributive policies the overwhelming majority of responses were in the 
affirmative, which was not surprising. However, though unprompted, a number of 
respondents added a caveat to their answer that expressed wariness toward the level of 
so-called “deservingness” of welfare recipients. Many expressed concern that welfare 
support (i.e., unemployment benefits) was either too easily accessible or the methods for 
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means-testing were not stringent enough. Interviews with Danish citizens reveal a 
general opinion in favor of limited welfare assistance, or welfare that people cannot take 
advantage of, which contrasts with the historic trend in such opinion in Scandinavian 
countries.  
When asked about their opinions related to immigration, the overall sentiment 
was positive, but not without reservations. While the majority held the undisputed 
affirmation that immigration as a whole yielded positive effects, many lamented the fact 
that immigrants do not integrate themselves with the rest of Danish Society. One 
memorable interviewee strongly affirmed his support for immigration, even going so far 
as to discredit right-wing politicians who suggested increasing immigration was 
dangerous; however, even he had this to say: 
“But of course I get annoyed by those who move into this country and still 
think they are mountain herders down in Pakistan—live in a parallel society 
with their own laws and their own jurisdiction—that annoys me.” 
 
Other respondents pointed to the fact that they choose to all live together in 
certain neighborhoods within Copenhagen rather than intermix with the native 
population. Yet, contrary to what one might expect, respondents rarely blamed the 
immigrants themselves for their lack of effort. Instead, blame was often assigned to the 
government for failing to properly absorb the immigrants. Such opinions within the 
Danish citizenry point towards a prominent desire for homogeneity within society 
where everyone acts and is “Danish”, rather than support for ethnic diversity. A 
conclusion could be drawn that highlights the idea that multiculturalism is not as 
important to the Danish populace, as much as a need for uniformity and homogeneity—
at least at the surface level.  
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After respondents were asked their opinions on the level of overall immigration, 
a follow-up question was asked to gage their opinions on “EU immigrants” or “Western 
immigrants”. The purpose of the question was to discern whether or not those 
interviewed felt differently towards those that had more similar backgrounds, ideals, or 
physical characteristics. The expectation was that if the respondents’ attitudes were 
shaped by in-group, out-group dynamics influenced by ethnic differences, there would 
be a high level of apathy measured in the interviewees’ responses. The answers did not 
deviate from expectations with the majority expressing indifference toward the idea and 
some suggested that Western immigrants had an easier time assimilating and thus go 
more unnoticed. Another possible explanation for the lack of interest or awareness for 
Western immigrants could be tied to their lack of visibility in Danish society. The 
higher visibility of supposed non-EU or non-Western immigrants could be due to a 
number of factors. However, since visibility is most likely due a difference in physical 
attributes such as difference in skin tone or other prominent “non-Danish” features, it is 
understandable to interpret such responses as motivated by ethnic differences. 
Racial attitudes are intensely difficult to examine and successfully gauge. In 
surveys, while some people may be truly unprejudiced, individuals often check 
themselves to comply with the norms of social desirability (Kuklinski et al. 1997). 
Though the interviews provided the opportunity for face-to-face interaction, which 
allowed for the observation of instantaneous responses rather than thought out answers, 
the results still may not convey a complete picture of the micro-level feelings towards 
those with diverse ethnic backgrounds.  
Additionally, the sampling of respondents was largely derived from convenience 
sampling and thus yielded a disproportionally large amount of students in their mid-
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twenties to mid-thirties. However, this also leads to an interesting phenomenon since 
students traditionally lean more left than the total population and they too often stated 
that benefits were too easily acceptable and that beneficiaries could too easily take 
advantage of the system. The more “neoliberal-themed” responses offered by a 
demographic group famous for its progressive stance, further strengthen the idea that 
public attitudes have shifted in recent years.  
 
Conclusion and Further Discussion 
While not definitive, the findings suggest a small level of statistical significance 
regarding the relationship between the percentage of foreign-born within a population 
and public support for redistributive policies. In combination with the interview data, 
the lack of a strong causal relationship, weakly supports the demographic determinism 
of immigration statistics. Instead, findings suggest a reason to believe that immigration 
plays a more nuanced role of assimilation and the extent to which immigrants are 
adopting the culture, language and norms of the dominant national tradition, or 
whether they are seeking to retain their ‘otherness’.  What is revealed is that it is not 
the absolute volume of immigration that matters, but rather something else that is at 
play. The interviews serve to illustrate this complicated relationship more vividly as 
many respondents reveal their preferences for immigrants that seek to assimilate into 
the society. Such findings imply an inherent rebellion against the concept of 
multiculturalism, which is unsurprising considering the conflicts that tend to arise 
between different ethnic groups.  
Current debates over multiculturalism involve two different concepts of 
citizenship, jus soli and jus sanguinis. Respectively, these are the concepts of civic 
nationalism versus cultural nationalism. Civic nationalism rests on a sense of national 
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unity and purpose based on a set of commonly held political beliefs (i.e., the United 
States). This sense of community focuses upon residence, where citizenship is gained by 
being born on the soil or within the territory—a common territorial homeland—and 
involvement in the state and civil society of that homeland (Brown 1999). Cultural 
nationalism is the acceptance of a common cultural characteristic and mandates that 
only those who share that characteristic can be included in the nation (i.e., Japan). Jus 
sanguinis is the basic idea that membership within a nation means that one must be of 
the blood of the nation. 
From the interview responses it is not immediately obvious to which school of 
thought most of the Danish population subscribes. When asked the question “What 
does it mean to be Danish”, which reasonably could provoke a large variety of 
responses, there was never a suggestion of exclusivity. For many of the interviewees, 
there was however, a focus on safety where a visible theme emerged from the responses, 
that the Danish people like to feel safe. With multiple citizens memorably comparing 
Danish culture to that of the hobbits from The Lord of the Rings: 
“Danish people are a little bit like hobbits--we like our own little bubble and we 
hate it when stuff outside disturbs us, and as long as people outside don’t 
disturb our bubble, we don’t look outside. We like to live in it…I think it’s a 
safety thing. Danish culture is about being safe, we like being safe…” 
 
While the metaphor may be attributed to current events in popular culture (The 
Hobbit was released during the same time, December 2013), the idea of safety was a 
popular response. The focus on safety could be translated to an aversion of insecurity—
a notoriously common reaction to ethnic heterogeneity. Tension between ethnic groups 
has already erupted leading to fear in other Northern European countries, such as the 
immigrant-led riots in Sweden (Higgens 2013). Such situations generate fear and 
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mistrust between ethnic groups, which can undermine the public goods provision that is 
integral to Northern European welfare states (Habyarimana 2007). It is quite possible 
that higher levels of insecurity within such “hobbit-like” societies would produce a very 
“hobbit-like” rejection of such changes. 
Moreover, the inflammatory remarks of the newly-popular, right-wing political 
groups would suggest a strong association with assimilationist views and the jus sanguis 
conceptualization of citizenship. Most vividly, in an ad placed by the Danish People’s 
Party, the anti-immigrant party warns “Mass rape, violence, insecurity, forced 
marriages, repression of women, gang-related crime. This is what a multi-ethnic society 
offers us.” While there was intense backlash directed towards the party afterwards, and 
the party eventually retracted the ad, the sentiment still remains. The party’s main 
website demonstrates this attitude quite frankly, “Denmark is not an immigrant-country 
and never has been. Thus we will not accept transformation to a multiethnic society” 
(Dansk FolkeParti). Furthermore, because the interview responses suggest that Danish 
people are categorizing immigrants as an ‘other’, due to their apparent lack of 
assimilation, it is possible that the Danish people as a whole, also subscribe more mildly 
to the ideas of cultural nationalism. This is an especially significant suggestion since the 
majority of interviewees were likely members of a more socially progressive population, 
thus there adherence to this concept would have stronger implications for the rest of 
society. Ultimately, the immigrants’ ‘otherness’ would lead people in Denmark to reject 
the idea of them as part of the citizenship among whom risk and income—and thus 
welfare as a whole—should be shared.  
All of these results hint at the idea that conversations surrounding welfare state 
could instead truly be conversations surrounding the notion of ‘citizenship’, of which 
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welfare has become a proxy war. Such ideas are supported by the research, which allows 
for the conclusion of a much more interesting finding, namely that membership in a 
political community is not based on any primordial concept of race or ethnicity; rather, 
it is subject to integrative behavior associated with assuming the dominant culture, 
language, and other defining characteristics. This finding challenges the original idea 
that racialized theories of welfare stigma can be imported from the United States to the 
current situation in Europe. Additionally, it suggests the literature on ethnic 
heterogeneity and public goods provision coming out of the developing world is also 
inappropriate for understanding the Northern European concept of citizen and political 
community.  
On the other hand, the findings suggest a very productive agenda for future 
research, which would look more closely at how people understand what it means to be 
Danish, Swedish, etc., and the conditions under which someone can acquire that 
identity. Few scholars have joined an examination of identity politics with welfare state 
research, but the subject of immigration in Europe has brought identity and issues of 
assimilation to the forefront (for example: in France it is currently illegal to wear full 
headscarves in public, and in both France and Denmark, the practice of Halal-style food 
preparation is being challenged (Titley 2014)) 
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